Campus protests today: delusional, self-destructive

The current protests have no identifiable national political goals. They are futile and ultimately self-defeating. They are grounded on a academic far-left myth that the US controls a neocolonial vassal state in Israel. That is not only false, it is incredibly misguided. There is no real politics with any practical domestic application to these current “protests.” It is simply increasing cynicism and persuading susceptible students to stay home/ not vote on election day. I am disappointed with this particular podcast, I am saddened to see what the far left is doing at a time when we desperately need to work with those with whom we may not agree, but who recognize the existential threat of a possible election of Trump and the fascist undoing of the Constitution he represents. Policy changes from within. Adolescent rebellion doesn’t get you Roe v Wade, but failure to engage real politics almost certainly got us Dobbs.

What Netanyahu is doing is terrible, unconscionable. Certainly the US gov’t. should be more strident in their condemnation of it, and more tightfisted with aid to Tela Viv. But these protests won’t achieve that. Only working within the systems can policy be changed. The far left professors have never worked within the system, and their view of practical politics is as contemptuous and dismissive as that of MAGA. They know the protests will fail. Their instigation of protests among students is to throw a wrench into the whole electoral process. They prefer Trump, because they believe if things get worse, there will come a general uprising. This is a childish misreading of the history of modern revolutions. At any rate all they really can achieve is further division among people who should be working together to defeat real fascism – no, not your neighborhood policemen, most of whom, are actually struggling to fulfill their obligations according to their legal mandate (which is policy, and can only be properly changed by practical work within the system). No, right now we know who the real fascists are, Trump and his horde.

And yes cleansing Palestine “from river to the sea” is strongly anti-Jewish, since it really says Israel – and its people – must be irradicated. We need greater common knowledge and awareness of the history of Israel (as do Netanyahu and his own horde of ultra-orthodox fanatics, who also, in their own way, seem bent on self-destruction). At any rate, the geo-politics of that area just cannot be reduced to sentiment and easy solutions.

But is the real shared mental illness in the post-post-modern era essentially self-destructive delusions and the willingness to visit these on others by whatever means?

tRump’s new scam: gold-sprayed poop

“Your bigly favorite president here! They say I owe 500 million dollars , but they say wrong! I have consulted all kinds of people almost as smart as me, legal scholars and bible scholars and historians who think I’m the greatest there ever was, and agreed! There is no judgment, there are no judges, there is only absolute immunity. Just like my friend Vladimir – Nalvany Pelosi died or one of them did, and it reminded me how great I am and how terrible the United States is and how much money we need to enjoy our great movement to have me rightfully installed in the White House (it’s not an office, our beloved constitution says I don’t need to support it, it’s in the original text and there’s only been two amendments, don’t let the Democrat party convince you otherwise, all fake news!). But as my gift to you who love me (LOVE ME!) I bring you a limited edition Bag of Poop! That’s right, my poop in a gold tinted bag, just what you need to whack the radical left communists and Mexicans on the head when they don’t say good things about Vlad and Me – the Donald! Fragrant poop collected from golden toilet bowls, and some scraped from nappies I occasionally wear when plying golf. Which I don’t do much anymore, maybe 12 hours a day, I’m way too busy saving the world one twit at a time, no more World War 4, I put an end to it. Very smart!

“Only 500 bags of poop available at $999.99 each! Get ’em while it’s hot! All the best poop – bigger even than Adolf, and I don’t even know who he is, or Germany! The 1930s, long time ago! Let’s bring US back to that (See how clever I am? no one ever noticed U – S spells us and America too! Genius – very stable. I know a duck when I saw one on the intelligence test!

“Make America Germany Again!

“Who loves you? – well love me first, and I’ll think about it!

“Trump’s bag of poop! looks good on any altar or rifle rack!”

Worst case 2024: Crazed tRump, Armed tRumpers

It is my growing suspicion – no, really, my belief – that, should Democrats sweep the election of 2024 – Biden to a second term, the Senate and the House – Donald Trump will not only refuse to concede but will call on his MAGA followers to march on Washington and this time fully armed. Really, given his decaying personality, and his openly Fascist rhetoric, I don’t think he cannot not do this. He would have to effect an overthrow of the Constitutional government to achieve any of his personal goals of self-aggrandizement which are the only goals he cares about. It’s pathetic, it’s sick, but it dovetails into the fantasies of the conspiracy theory mob, the Christian Nationalists, the white supremacists and neo-Nazis who form the core of his following.

The questions for future discussion – but before it actually happens – is: 1) what would be the response of the Republican Party and its politicians? Especially since they have spent years now taking his tiny dong up their backsides for his promise of a few votes (which he can never seem to deliver in fair elections). 2) what would be the Democratic response, given that they keep trying to ignore the Fascism of the other Party or the real threat Trump poses? 3) How will Joe Biden respond as President, given that calling out the military against domestic terrorist assault on the Capitol would be a commitment to see the battle through to the other side, and some reconstruction following? (And what will the military do when asked for this?) 4) How is the Press going to handle it, given their blind effort to normalize Trump and all his outrageous, traitorous shenanigans just to keep the advertising revenue coming in?

This isn’t contemplating a “Constitutional crisis.” This is having to face the possibility of a possible crisis of history itself, much as this country struggled through in the Civil War. But perhaps once Trump and his minions are finally put down, with all necessary force, perhaps we can as a nation rethink our common values and the America we wish to live in, given the changes in the world political and economic environment in which we live (whether we like or want to acknowledge those changes, that environment, or not).

I join with any readers of good will in hoping this doesn’t happen (it doesn’t need to); but I think we should prepare ourselves for its possibility.

Not ever tRump

Democrats, it is true, have some policies that seem to be ‘kinder, gentler’ versions of neo-liberalism, which in the primaries past I argued against, and in any normal election would vote against. But these are, ultimately, policy disagreements which can be discussed reasonably and compromised.

It is making a gross misjudgment, that Donald Trump has any policy positions whatsoever. This man is a complete sociopath, everything about him screams it. He doesn’t ‘lie’ in a purposeful manner, he simply sees no reason to tell the truth. He is all bluster and faux anger and domination. Assuming he wants to be president again (and there is some evidence that he doesn’t, that this may be a scam in order to the indictments against him), he doesn’t want to be the leader of the world’s only real superpower, he wants to be *boss*, to tell people what to do, to make deals, to open a hotel next to the White House, to use public funds to settle old debts, to threaten perceived enemies. He feels no commitment to the rule of law, doesn’t understand the Constitution and its branches of government, is disrespectful of American history (about which he knows little), is insensitive to the needs of wide swaths of the population.

The notion that we should vote for change – at any cost – that is, just shoot the dice on this megalomaniac again, and see what comes up, is frivolous. Chester Himes ends one of his novels with a metaphor that sums up such thinking – a blind man with a gun in a subway gets jostled and just starts shooting.

2024 may prove the worst election in history. With a Trump rebellion achieving the White House or both that and Congress – then the US will truly have a thoroughly illegitimate government, and I’m not sure that we can recover, since we’ve been going down that road for so long.

It is simply wrong to believe that any vote in next year’s election is going to make things better. It is a choice between an old man with experience who understands the inner workings of Washington (so, yes, the status quo) – and a blind old man with a pistol. For most people, it’s not really a choice between ‘the lesser of two evils.’ It’s a choice between continuing the precarious balance of the status quo; or a rapid descent into indecency, moral corruption, and embarrassing displays of executive hubris, especially in foreign policy and concerning minorities and immigrants.

Again, note that I do not critique Trump’s policy positions – because he doesn’t actually have any. What he has is a collage of things other people have said, verbalizations of ideas suggested by questionable political commentators, efforts to capture the anxieties of a working class he has, as employer, treated repeatedly with contempt,; a patchwork of borrowed phrases. buried rumors, conspiracy theory innuendos, and reality TV performance hutzpah. He’s a clown show whose very presence in the coming election cycle denigrates the meaning of elections here, and shames our history by reminding us that many Americans are more interested in the charms and entertainment of carnival barkers than they are in art, science, or serious political policy.

Despite the Electoral College, every vote matters, given the probable violence that Trump will attempt to instigate, it will help to have data to underscore his loss, because Trump is such a deplorable public personality; he’s just a grifter on the hustle, and he hasn’t anything to sell that decent Americans should want. Third party candidates would only help him get elected.  It’s a two-way race – Americas or Trump.  There is no third choice.

The worst that Democrats can offer is ‘more of the same;’ and Trump offers so much worse (and intentionally offers it, because it gets him audiences he can rant to). No, not the end of the world, but the end of any illusion (or hope) for a democratic republic we might still, with some sense of belonging if not pride, call America.

So vote against his fascist sycophantic MAGA_Republican cult; vote against Trump. He is a mockery of long cherished values of our democratic republic. Those values are very little realized these days; but they remain good values, worthy of teaching our children. Do not let them go gently into that good night – rage, rage against the dying of the light.

Oldie but maybe goodie: “I am not Kirk.”

Back in the day, I wrote a lot of these riffs on stuff I was reading on the Internet, most of which ending up as mere notes in larger pieces. But a couple were fairly complete. This one especially I’ve always remembered fondly. It was written in response to a discussion at a philosophy blog, the long defunct Scientia Salon; it concerns the question of possible worlds, possible selves, and quantum mechanics. So, it’s a bit of science fiction, a bit of commentary on thought-experiments, a bit of simple lunacy. There are some pretty obscure references tossed in for good bewilderment – for instance to Dr. Who and to the bridge scene in Monty Python and the Holy Grail – but I think the momentum carries the humor. But let the reader decide.

I Am Not Kirk
E. John Winner

“Ralph, let’s go out for the night; you’re such a couch potato! What are you watching now? Isn’t that the latest reboot of Star Trek?”
“I like the old series. You know, I’ve been reading philosophy blogs on the interwebs about a thought-experiment concerning the series you might be interested in. In the series, it’s common practice for crew members to ‘beam down’ from their star ship onto a planet via a ‘matter transporter,’ right? Well, the experiment these philosophers have come up with – well, the experiment isn’t so experimental, it’s really simply the question: Kirk steps into the transporter and apparently disintegrates, only to re-integrate on the planet’s surface; now, is the Kirk on the planet surface truly a continuance of the Kirk in the star ship, or has the starship Kirk perished, and his neurological patterns reprogrammed in a reconstructed duplicate of the first Kirk’s brain?”
“Why work your own brain that hard, Ralph? It’s only a television show, for crike’s sakes.”


Star Trek: The Possible (Re)Generations: This week’s episode, “Too Many Kirks.”

“USS Enterprise, Captain’s Log, Stardate 252525.25: I am transporting down to the planet Doppelganger to convince the inventor of the transporter, Doctor Duplicity, to return to the Federation. Transporter systems throughout the Star Fleet have been going haywire at an alarming rate, leading to profound epistemological and metaphysical questions among the men, women, and – well, whatever those things from Gamma Nine are – who are committed to boldly go where no man or woman or whatever those things are from Gamma Nine have gone before. We must find the answers to these questions, or demonstrate that propositions concerning them are nonsense.”

James T. Kirk stepped onto the transporter platform. “Is the rest of the team already on the planet, Ensign?”

“да ты дурак,” Ensign Chekov responded in Russian; he had been speaking exclusively in Russian since the last time he had been transported aboard the Enterprise, apparently no longer able to speak English. Brain scans had revealed that the cells in his brain that had allowed him to do so had been replaced by a first edition of the Brothers Karamazov. Another failing of the transporter! But Kirk had faith in the capacity of modern technology to modify text uploads correctively.

“I’ll take that in the affirmative, Ensign. Very well; energize.”

The hum of machinery surged; Kirk felt himself coming apart, atom by atom – “Something’s gone wrong – stop!” But it was too late. It suddenly occurred to him that he was dying; it was the last thought he ever had….

James T. Kirk stepped off the transporter platform on the planet Doppelganger. Everything seemed to be the same as it ever was, but somehow he felt, well, discombobulated, as though every cell in his body was vibrating to some rhythm he had never known before. He was a great fan of classic rock, but this felt like death metal! Nonetheless, he pulled himself together to walk up to the old man in the white lab-coat, Doctor Duplicity, and held out his hand. The Doctor demurred. “I never shake hands – I stir them. Won’t you step into my parlor?”

But Kirk was in a confrontational mood. “Doctor, you must return to the Federation! The transporter systems you designed for us – they’re all going wrong. Last week, Uhura beamed up with bigger breasts and grey hair! And Sulu has gone gay!”

Duplicity hung his head, “I was afraid of this. The programming of biological units can get very tricky, especially when new….”

Kirk grabbed him by the collar and shook him. “You MUST TELL me WHAT’s going ON HERE!”

Duplicity pushed him away. “Calm down! Gad, you remind me of that old ham actor, William Shatner! All right, I can’t hide the truth anymore. I was saving it for my memoirs, but giving it a plug here might boost sales. There never was a transporter system – material transport across space is impossible. What you call a transporter is actually… a cloning device. It beams a wave of quanta, reappearing as particles, programmed to combine into a clone of the original, including its neurological patterns.”

“And… the original?”

“Dead, of course. The biological theorists were right. But -” he held out a comforting hand to Kirk’s shoulder, “but don’t worry, son; you are just as much James T. Kirk as James T. Kirk ever was – before he was blasted into sub-atomic particles and died.”

But Kirk pulled away. He felt shrunken, weak, not quite himself…. Indeed, he didn’t know who he was anymore. A thousand thoughts spun about in his brain – memories he could no longer claim as his, values he no longer believed in – that vicious bloodhound he should have phasered at the poker game – dam’ dog won every pot. Oh, if only he had known!

But slowly, he pulled himself together and straightened up. Cool blue eyes stared with fierce determination at Doctor Duplicity.

“No,” he declared, “that can no longer be. I live, I am now – but I am not Kirk!”

A year later, Kirk James, as he now liked to be called, sat in his office, as administrator of the Doppelganger Hospital for Bewildered Clones, with his closest colleagues – Nurse McCoy Bones (as he now liked to be called) and Doctor Spock Missy (as she now liked to be called).

“Gentleman,” he said, “and lady, first order of business – the Board of Directors say we need to reduce cost in our Quantum-Level Brain Surgery Department. Any suggestions, Bones?”

“I’m a nurse not a doctor, dammit!” Bones retorted.

“Quite right.” He pressed the intercom. “Uhura, get Doctor Dammit on the line and tell him he has to come up with some way to cut costs in surgery this week.”

“Phone him yourself, you chauvinist pig!” Uhura’s voice snapped back. James winced. He had supported her involvement in radical feminism, but now she was sounding like a stereotype. Of course, possibly that was because there were two of her now….

“Gentleman – and woman -” he lowered his voice conspiratorially, “now we must get on to the big project. Has the new technology arrived?”

“Yes, it arrived safely yesterday,” Missy assured him.

“Via shuttlecraft?”

“Yes – no transporter involved.”

“Good, good!” The machine in reference was the Singularizer. It had been developed by Professor Monotone at the University of Male Menopause on the planet Stigma. Purportedly, it used the genetic material of a clone to regenerate the body and being of the clone’s original, whole.

“Kirk, don’t you realize how dangerous this could be?” complained Bones, “We step in that box, we might not ever come out alive! Haven’t we tampered enough with the laws of nature?”

“Let nature get a lawyer, then. But I’m not going to my grave thinking that my existence depended on the death of James T. Kirk – one of Star Fleet’s finest commanding officers, even if he was a ham actor.”

“There is no logic to that,” Missy noted, “- that’s why I love you, James; I always have.”

“We’ll discuss that tonight if we survive.”

“Or our clones will, if we die,” Bones muttered.

“That’s a risk we’ll have to take. Is it all set up, Missy?”

“In the basement behind the rubbish tips.”

“Good! Well, then,” he rose to his feet, “let’s boldly go where no clones have gone before!”

A year later, T. Jimmy Kirk, the new head of the Doppelganger Hospital for Bewildered Clones, was on his communicator with the engineer assigned to dismantling the wildly out-of-control Singularizer, which no longer needed any clone to enter its singulizer chamber – it was sending out singularizer beams across the planet. Except the singularizer beams didn’t singularize, they multiplied. “Have you yet tried everything you could think of, Scotty?”

“I’ve given her all I got! And me name’s not Scotty, it’s Irishy.”

“Where the hell’s Scotty?!”

“I think he’s off getting a wee bit drunk.”

“Well, send Welshy off to look for him!” He slammed down the communicator and looked at his most trusted colleagues: Spock 1.1, Spock 1.2, Missy 3.0, Bones the Doctor, Bones the Nurse, Bones the Lab Technician and Bones the Janitor.

“Well, this is a fine how’d’ya’do.” he remarked in exasperation.

Spock 1.1, the literalist, held out his hand. “How do you do?”

Spock 1.2, with his suspicious mind, asked “how do I do what?”

Kirk glared at them. “I seem to recall one of my previous selves telling one of your previous selves that he needed you. He was wrong. You! Bones the Lab Technician!’

Bones scowled. “I’m a doctor, not a lab technician, dammit!”

“Then you -“

Another Bones scowled. “I’m a nurse, not a lab technician Jimmy!”

“Oh, well, then you -“

“Yes, sir!”

“Go down and give Irishy a hand.”

“But I’ve only got two – which one?”

“Just go!”

Bones left. But another Bones piped up: “Uh, Jimmy, that was the Janitor. He lost a few neurons in the last cloning. I’m the Lab Tech.”

Kirk tore his hair. “Will you go down there and -“

“No,” Bones the Lab Technician replied, “I’ve decided to spend the rest of my days reading poetry.” And he pulled out a volume of Wordsworth.

A fuzzy haired Englishman in a floppy hat and multi-colored scarf suddenly appeared in the doorway. “I think I have a solution to your multiplicity, Kirk – just regenerate into Captain Picard.” He popped out again.

“What the -?!”

Nurse Bones assured Kirk, “He’s the doctor who -“

“That’s another universe!” He sank his head into his hands and wept.

A knock on the door sobered him up. “Come in!” he and his colleagues sang out in harmony.

It was one of the now many Doctor Duplicitys, a data-spread in hand. “Kirk, I’ve made an analysis; at the rate the Singularizer is multiplying all those on the planet Doppelganger, as well duplications resulting from transporter failures across the Federation, well … let’s just say that every planet in the known universe will have a billion members of the crew of the Star Ship Enterprise – alone – in about 6.7 years.”

There was silence – interrupted by the communicator buzzing. Kirk listened to it on ‘private’ mode, then responded, “Yes, Mrs. Kirk, I’ll be home by dinner.” He flipped it off.

“You married your own clone?” Duplicity asked dubiously.

“She had an operation.” Kirk rose from his desk and went to the window. The square mile plaza before the Hospital was filled with various Kirks, McCoys, Spocks, Duplicitys, Uhuras, Sulus, etc., etc., etc., all wondering exactly who they were, and what their genealogy actually amounted to. He contemplated the unspeakable – multicide – the elimination of all clones – as the only way of preserving the integrity of the universe. This universe, anyway. “There’s only one solution,” he murmured. “I’ve heard of a weapon of total destruction -“

“Good heavens,” cried Duplicity, “Not the Next Big Bang Device!”

Kirk turned slowly to face him – or at least the ‘him’ that was in the room at the time. “Yes, I mean -“

The door flew open. “Wait!” a voice rang out. There, standing before them was a man appearing, in all identifiable ways, even upon closest inspection, to be none other James T. Kirk.

“Who are you?” suspiciously minded Spock 1.2 demanded.

“I am the original James T. Kirk.”

“You must be joking,” Jimmy Kirk quipped.

“I don’t know anybody named Joe King. I am James T. Kirk. You see, the Star Ship transporters always needed to retain at least one quantum particle from the original in order to perfect its cloning duplication; and the Singularizer has been producing clones to the number that every clone has at least one quantum particle from the original. There are now enough Kirk clones in the universe, such that, by borrowing a quantum particle from each of you -“

Jimmy Kirk winced as a nose hair pulled itself free and flew up the nose of the professed James T. Kirk. “Ouch!”

“Yes, there it is, the last particle; I am now complete, fully reconstituted in my original form.” He stepped to the window to look out over the multitude of suffering humanity. “And in this form, I can lead you all, to the next level of higher consciousness in the ground of being….” He threw open the window, clearly prepared to minister to the masses with a sermon.

Jimmy Kirk narrowed his eyes; Spock 1.2 wasn’t the only one there with a suspicious mind. “Wait!” he demanded. James T. Kirk turned toward him. Jimmy smirked, and asked, “And, what is your favorite color?”

James T. Kirk’s face reddened and his eyes danced while his brain searched itself for answers. “I… I don’t know!” he admitted. His particles blasted into nothingness.

“Well,” said Jimmy, “another would-be messiah bites the dust.”

(But in fact he was the original James T. Kirk; he just couldn’t remember his favorite color.)

Jimmy sighed. “That leaves us no other recourse. To save the universe from ourselves, I fear we must destroy -“

His communicator buzzed.

“Aye, Jimmy!”

“Irishy?”

“Nay, this be Scotty!” It must be, thought Jimmy – he sounded totally sloshed.

“Report, Engineer Scotty 2000!”

“It’s all over, the Singularizer is nay-more!”

Everyone in the room breathed a sigh of relief. “Scotty!” Jimmy cried jubilantly,” I knew you could do it, you old toolie -!”

“T’warn’t me, Jimmy! T’war Bones the Janitor! He pulled the plug from the wall-socket.”

Jimmy slowly closed the lid on his communicator. There was still all those millions, trying to establish identities for themselves. Not to mention the Social Security numbers, and the IRS forms needing done by April 14…. But the universe was saved.

Still, he felt the ponderous weight of being the replacement for someone other than himself, the terrifying sense of being somehow, well, mediocre.

He turned to his colleagues to note: “Ever get the sense you’re a character in a really bad B-Movie?”

Next Week, on Star Trek, the Possible (Re)Generations:

“Captain, I’m trapped in a Chinese room! And I don’t speak Chinese!”

“Don’t worry, Chekov, we’ll slip symbols under the door, eventually you can pretend to learn the language!”

“You’re turning me into a failed Turing machine!”

“Chekov – we – are – now – Borg – you – will – join – the – hive -“

On the next exciting episode of Star Trek, the Possible (Re)Generations!

This is a public service announcement: Friends, if you have work to do around the house, the pZombie agency has millions of unemployed dead –


“Alice, can’t we get anything decent on TV these days?”

“I told ya, let’s go bowling! It may be expensive, but at least we’ll meet some interesting scientists there!”

The Deceptions of Humor, The Amusement of Lies

by E. John Winner

The basic claim of this essay is that jokes and lies share similar semiotic structures, both originating in play, and both playing upon audience expectations, by effectively creating a fictitious ‘model world’ of signs that reassure the audience that their expectations will be met (or, in a situation of openly comedic performance, that they will be disappointed in an amusing way).  (Indeed, I may go so far as to say that the only difference between a good lie and good joke, is that liars never reveal to the audience that they’re lying.)  I do this by first critiquing a joke relayed by Umberto Eco, and then explicating a brief passage by Eco on semiotics and lying.  In order to press the investigation, I will write in somewhat stronger terms than my source material suggests, because I am trying to establish a framework for interpretation.  A complete theory would need considerably stronger evidence and argumentative finesse than I can provide here.

First, let’s approach at a tangent, which necessarily reveals the basics of what such a theory might account for.  What follows came to me while I was watching an eagle fly.

I should explain:  An eagle fly is a winged insect of a centimeter in length and half as much in width; it has a protruding head with a fly’s myriad eye formations; notable for the manner in which it ceases to flutter its wings on descent and instead, glides to the surface where it lands.

No, I lied, there’s no such animal, at least as far as I’m aware; if it exists, this will come as an amusing surprise.

The nature of lying begins in the joke.  Lying is always a kind of game.  The old shell game run by con-artists on the street, whereby a pea is placed under one of three shells, and an participant audience member gambles money on a choice of which of the shells it might be under.  But – ha ha – it isn’t under any of them, the con-artist has palmed it.  It is a cruel deception, but also a crude joke, presupposing that the participating audience member – the victim of the con, the butt of the joke – has some authority over something the con-artist wants, and from which he or she must be solicited into parting, against his/her better judgment.  So the con can be read as a subversion of the gullible player’s authority, and thus spoofs the sense of agency from which that authority derives.

There are other ways to read this exchange, but they all resolve to a model of deception per se – but also for any joke.   Expectations are established, then disrupted, their grounding assumptions subverted.  Successful deception may have a myriad of rewards; a good joke only laughter.

But which comes first, humor or deception?  Without getting deeply into metaphysics or neuroscience here, I think it’s safe to assume they share a point of origin.  Infants soon learn to use their own behavior to prompt certain responses from their parents, and will sometimes do so in a manner that appears to be testing the reliability of the behavioral prompt.  This is not truly deceptive, but part of the process of learning behavioral communication.  Still, an infant may cry as though hungry, when he or she only desires the closeness of the mother’s body.  But what else is the infant to do?  If the nipple comes along with the body, all the better.  But the infant in that instance may then reveal a nascent sense of humor, playing with the nipple, rather than taking to suck, much to the mother’s annoyance.  Situations such as this are frequently remarked by mothers as, “I don’t know what the baby wants!” [1]  Perhaps, baby wants an eagle fly.

Umberto Eco is now best known as a writer of dense, entertaining, and thoughtful novels.  But he also happens to have written a number of important, well-researched, erudite scholarly texts in the field of semiotics – the study of how humans read the world, and communicate with it, through signs.  Traditionally, the role of the scholarly writer has been to produce texts derivative of research and to postulate conclusions such research might suggest, in a language that is technical and precise, but also reasonably clear, at least to other scholars in the field.  There can be a certain grace to it.  Nonetheless, only the writer of popular literature is allowed the elegance (or brutishness) of wordplay, earned through a kind of stormy love affair with language.  In scholarly writing, communication of ideas matters most; in creative writing, a playful construction of an illusion, using only language, is the imperative.  It was only after achieving success as a novelist (with The Name of the Rose) that Eco allowed himself a certain leeway in writing his scholarly texts with elegance and even wit, which he had first developed stylistically as a contributor to popular journals of cultural criticism in the later ’60s.

I say this, because we will here review a text by Eco, appearing in an earlier scholarly text (Theory of Semiotics) that happens to be an amusing joke, but rather badly told.  It has a real-world aspect (it spoofs confirmation bias in clinical behavioral studies), but removed into a fantasy world of cunning animals, akin to those we find in animated cartoons.

There is an old joke according to which two dogs meet in Moscow, one of them very fat and wealthy, the other pathetically emaciated.  The latter asks the former:  ‘How can you find food?’  The former zoosemiotically replies:  ‘That’s easy.  Every day, at noon, I enter the Pavlov Institute and I salivate: Immediately afterwards a conditioned scientist arrives, rings a bell and gives me food.’ [2]

Verbal humor can be very context-dependent; verbal jokes may rely entirely on historical name recognition, as Eco’s does.  Once all memory of the Soviet behavioral scientist Pavlov is lost, the joke will require explanation:  In the early 20th century, in a clinical experiment, Pavlov conditioned a dog to salivate in response to the stimuli of a ringing bell, with the reward of food.  (It helped to perform this experiment every day at the same time, hence the need to specify a specific hour in the joke.)

In the film The Cocoanuts, Groucho Marx sets up a dinner party audience with the remark “…and that reminds me of the joke about the Irishman,” only to deflate their expectations (but reward the movie-viewer’s) with the anti-climactic “gee, I wish I could remember it.”  [3]  Eco’s “old joke” must have been funny once; if only Eco had remembered why.  The scholar of the text we have here, considerably reduces the joke’s humor by remaining true to his scholarly commitments.  The standardized grammar is precisely given; the eating dog must restate Pavlov’s experiment as close to the original as possible (set time, bell, salivation, food, conditioning).  And of course there has to be a professional insider’s comment – the dogs communicate “zoosemiotically,” because we all know that dogs don’t talk.

Frankly, I don’t understand why the fat dog also has to be “wealthy.” Can’t a poor dog deceive the scientists just as well?

The truth is, we don’t need all the information Eco provides us in his joke.  Let dogs talk, for the sake of the joke.  Don’t duplicate the experiment exactly — that’s overly complicated.  And using ‘proper grammar’ in a joke slows the pace of delivery and sounds stilted (unless that effect is part of the humor).  Part of the fun of jokes is their chronic abuse of conventional semiotic codes.

I don’t offer the following version of Eco’s joke because I know it to be funnier than his (although I hope so).  But I would argue that it is closer to the brevity and pace most Americans expect of a joke.

Two dogs meet in Moscow.  One’s very hungry, the other says he eats every day.  The first asks “how?”  “That’s easy,” says the other, “I go to the Pavlov Institute and salivate; they ring a bell and feed me.”

Every joke creates a fantasy world, wherein our expectations are played.  In this particular world, dogs talk.  All we need of the experiment is the bell, the salivation, the feeding (the conditioning is presumed, once the signifier ‘Pavlov’ is recognized, and the presumption is part of the humor).  While this is acceptable English, it borders on poor grammar; a few words less and it’s in fragments.  The whole is only a little more than half as long as Eco’s.

Jokes are allowed to transgress.  Groucho can effectively dupe his dinner party audience, then reveal the duping, and thus mock that audience, precisely because this inverts the social expectations of the context.   Eco’s version of the joke plays it safe; neither scientists not scholars are sufficiently lampooned to make the joke truly amusing.  And jokes require economy of expression.  The con-artist can’t allow the victim time to analyze the game.

Which returns us to our primary consideration.  Both jokes and lies first generate a fantasy context, an alternate reality, which raises expectations in the audience, only to discredit those expectations.  Of course the joke is such, because the audience is made aware of the disappointment in an unexpected way.  A good lie will not be noticed as such by the audience (but the liar knows).

In a brief but loaded remark, found in a paper on C. S. Peirce appearing in his The Role of The Reader, Umberto Eco writes:

The self-sufficiency of the universe of content, provided by a given culture, explains why signs can be used in order to lie (and therefore to elaborate ideologies, works of art, and so on).  What Peirce calls signs (which to somebody stand for something else in some respect or capacity) are such just because I can use a representamen in order to send back to a fictitious state of the world.  Even an index can be falsified in order to signify an event which is not detectable and, in fact has never caused its supposed representamen.  Signs can be used in order to lie, for they send back to objects or states of the world only vicariously. [4] [5]

The receiver of a deceptive representing sign — a sign-as-lie — believes he or she is in the world of the represented, when really the world of the sign is but a model world, composed of signs.  The sign-as-lie is given in reference to a catalog of other signs, to the veracity of which the sender is indifferent.  (Some may have found my “eagle fly” lie persuasive because it deployed the language — the catalog, or system of signs — of ‘objectivity’ and scientific measurement, thus generating a possible world of scientific knowledge in which ‘eagle flies’ exist as measurable objects.)  This catalog of signs linked to and re-enforcing the sign-as-lie, if successful, is rich enough to elaborate a ‘possible world,’ and hence the illusion.

In the real world of the late 19th Century in New York City, the Brooklyn Bridge was built using political pressure and government funds, under agreement that government agencies would own and control it, in the interests of the larger number of those who would have to use it or would experience some socio-economic benefit from it.  But in the world of the old con-artist’s sale of the Bridge to tourists, it is privately owned.  This was actually a reasonable assumption at the time and for some decades after, since many bridges were indeed privately owned, including, for instance, the only bridges into New Orleans.  As privately owned, in the model capitalist world of the con, the Bridge could be sold.

Notice that there’s just enough real-world overlap for the con-game to be believable.  If there had been no privately owned bridges at the time, there would have been no contextual information with which to excuse some faith in the con-artist’s offer.  I say “excuse,” because — well, why does the victim of the fall so easily for the con?  Superficially, of course, we say he or she lacks education, perhaps intelligence, certainly necessary information (that’s why it continues on as a joke, long after its usefulness as a con has been exhausted).  But also, a safe inference derived from common American understanding of human nature, is that the victim’s motivation is a desire for a large, recognizable sign of wealth (a big, complicated, human-made object) that can be used to acquire further wealth, through the charge of a toll to cross the bridge.  In other words, the victim, motivated by greed and desire for status, has been setting up him/her self for the con by looking for the easy deal that will prove beneficial at not much cost.  The model world structured by the con is precisely the world the victim wants to live in. [7]

But isn’t that true of worlds of comedy as well?  They model worlds in which we find it safe to laugh with clever pranksters; to laugh at types of gullible innocents; or, if we’re honest enough, to laugh at ourselves.  In the real world study of psychology, Dr. Pavlov’s experiment must be considered critically, but with respect; in the fantasy Moscow of the joke, he’s just a laughable victim of a clever dog’s con.

—–

I have tried to draw out the deep relationship between humor and deception through the generation of model worlds, in which trusted real world signs are manipulated to mislead us into trusting falsifying signs of the model world; perhaps the only way to distinguish the two is by a revelation on the part of the humorist (which we may wait for in vain from the deceiver).  And I hope I have indicated that both humor and deception, playing upon the desires and expectations of their audience, cannot be fully articulated except contextually.

—–

E. John Winner holds a doctorate in English (specialties: rhetoric and literary theory) from SUNY Albany. He taught composition as an adjunct for twelve years; then worked as a Licensed Practical Nurse for twelve years. Health issues led him to a non-stressful office job with a security agency in upstate New York.

Notes

[1]  I actually tried to find clinical studies on this, on the internet; what I found was a plethora of sites of mothers complaining about this behavior and wondering what to do about it.  For instance:  http://www.circleofmoms.com/breastfeeding-moms/my-baby-pinches-and-plays-with-my-nipples-is-this-normal-434996 .

[2]  Umberto Eco, A Theory of Semiotics; Indiana U (1978).  Page reference missing from  the original draft this essay revises and completes.

[3]  The Cocoanuts, Paramount, 1929; directors R. Florey and J. Santley; written by George S. Kaufman and Morrie Ryskind (but including improvisations by the Marx Brothers themselves).

[4]  Umberto Eco, The Role of The Reader; Indiana U (1979).  Page 179.

[5]  As simple introduction to semiotics per se, I here reproduce a brief discussion of the relationship between a sign and its object by Charles Sanders Peirce:

Two men are standing on the seashore looking out to sea. One of them says to the other, ‘That vessel there carries no freight at all, but only passengers.’ Now, if the other, himself, sees no vessel, the first information he derives from the remark has for its Object the part of the sea that he does see, and informs him that a person with sharper eyes than his, or more trained in looking for such things, can see a vessel there; and then, that vessel having been thus introduced to his acquaintance, he is prepared to receive the information about it that it carries passengers exclusively. But the sentence as a whole has, for the person supposed, no other Object than that with which it finds him already acquainted. The Objects — for a Sign may have any number of them — may each be a single known existing thing or thing believed formerly to have existed or expected to exist, or a collection of such things, or a known quality or relation or fact, which single Object may be a collection, or whole of parts, or it may have some other mode of being, such as some act permitted whose being does not prevent its negation from being equally permitted, or something of a general nature desired, required, or invariably found under certain general circumstances.  C. S. Peirce, “Signs and their Objects;” Collected Papers Vol. 2, sections 230-232; Harvard (1932).

I chose this for its evident resonance with my discussion here.  Notice, for instance, that, in introducing the communicative use of sign-object relations, Peirce relates the dialog between two men who clearly feel ease in trusting each other.  But what if the one who claims to see the signs is lying?  Or what if he suddenly turns the dialog on its head: ‘Ha ha, no steamship, I was only joking!’  Or for that matter, what if the other man replies, ‘you’re kidding,’ or ‘I don’t believe you.’   We see here the beginning of considerable thinking on a host of matters in communications and social psychology.  (For further reading on semiotics, I suggest a listing of such to be found at Umberto Eco’s website: http://umbertoeco.com/en/semiotics-links.html)

[6]  The multiplicity of objects a sign may signify is actually a difficult but all important issue in semiotics, and is the chief reason that semiotics is not reducible to logic (and perhaps, arguably, encompasses it – but that would be a different discussion).  But see my meditation on the significance of the coffee cup at my blog:  https://nosignofit.wordpress.com/2014/09/21/the-vanishing-cup-of-coffee-a-semiotic-mystery/

[7]  But in this hope for a more profitable world, the Brooklyn Bridge purchaser is doubly victimized.  As former New York governor Al Smith once remarked on the Al Jolson radio show, it was a big disappointment to discover, once the Bridge was finally opened, that all one could do with it was go to Brooklyn.

The Elimination of Literature

E. John Winner

Every now and then, I’ll be walking down a street and come upon a box of books being set out for trash, and if they’re in good condition, I’ll look through them for anything of interest.  Some time ago, I found a massive High School English text-book, which I took to be an anthology of literature, and since I thought I might find something in it I may have overlooked in the past, I brought it home.  Gave it a quick browse and set it aside for future consideration.

Recently wrestling with a writer’s block, I dug it out, thinking I might find some inspiration.  Little did I know I would instead confront the devil’s spawn.

Elements of Literature was published in 2007 [1].  It was put together by “Program Authors” Kylene Beers (literacy specialist) and composition theorist Lee Odell.  The edition I have at hand was specifically designed as student preparation for the Pennsylvania System of School Assessment test (PSSA).  It’s 1500 7″x10″ glossy pages long.  It’s also a mess.

Given its title and subtitle (“Essentials of British and World literature”), one would assume that the main function of the book would be to introduce students to literature,  It’s not.  In place of an introduction extolling the delights one can find reading interesting or difficult texts that have through history contributed to our culture (what we commonly mean by ‘literature’), the book opens with instructions to the student on how to meet Pennsylvania’s “Language Arts Standards” and how to succeed at taking the PSSA.   Two of its 32 pages relate to the reading of literature.

The anthology itself is structured chronologically: 449 CE to “the Present.”  This would seem to suggest that the civilizations BCE had little to contribute to literature, but, classicists take heart!  This announced periodization is repeatedly violated throughout the book.  So, in the first part, after readings from BeowulfGilgamesh and then the Iliad (selections, of course) appear, with the Iliad supported by an essay about Schliemann’s 19th century excavations in search of Priam’s gold.  Throughout these presentations, the text is interspersed with sidebars and whole pages explaining the background of the selections, vocabulary, critical commonplaces, attempts to make the material of contemporary interest (apparently the spirit of the epic lives on … in comic books), as well as writing suggestions.  One such suggestion includes a sample student essay basically re-writing Hector’s experience of battle so he can overcome his fears and be “again the awesome, heroic ‘noble Hector’.”  (I mean, a totally awesome dude! [2])   After a small selection of shorter texts of the given period, a sample test completes the section.

A lot of this seems to make sense (students certainly need help with difficult vocabulary), but the presentation is just wretched.  None of the material is allowed to speak for itself.  The decision to use selections rather than whole texts robs the originals of their immediacy.  I think John Gardner’s Grendel is a wonderful book, but does the student need Beowulf interrupted by selections from it? or by an essay on “Life in 999?”

This is basically the strategy for presentation throughout the book, except that it gets worse the closer we get to the present era, since of course feminism and multicultural concerns must be accounted for.  Fair enough, there are some wonderful texts written by all genders and every ethnicity.  But the bias in selection is primarily academic — texts from writers who sell best in university towns.  And the presentation strategy becomes ever more confused, as justification for considering recent writing as somehow of equivalent value with long-enduring texts has never been strong since the practice started a hundred or so years ago [3].  By the time we get to a selection of recent speeches by international political leaders, it’s hard to see what “elements of literature” we actually are dealing with here.

It must be said that the very size of the book, its large glossy pages, its visual design (a weird hybrid of old style double-column print and Internet flavored graphics), all mitigate against a student’s taking interest in it.  One could easily get the impression that the “elements of literature” are comprised of everything ever written or said, heard or seen.  The student is recurrently encouraged to see movie versions of the texts or just movies; although, blessedly, there’s nothing about television here.  (I wonder how the ”program authors” missed that?)  Research emphasis is on the Internet, of course.

The last literary texts to appear in the book (actually presented as part of a practice test, calling for a comparison between the two), are the poems The Lorelei by Heinrich Heine and Margaret Atwood’s Siren Song.  Not bad selections for a practice test.  Yet a strange way to say farewell to literature, to bemoan the dangers of song leading listeners to destruction.

Let’s talk about the specific moment, when I realized that what I held in my hands was a petty educational system bureaucrat’s parody of what an introduction to literature ought to look like.  Page 316 presents Shakespeare’s Sonnet 30.  [4]  It begins with an Introduction stressing that the student is expected to look for metaphors — “comparisons of two unlike things” (which is not a very good definition of metaphor) — and closes with a series of questions emphasizing what metaphors the student was expected to look for.  One of the more amusing questions: “What thoughts cheer (the speaker) up?”  So, to be clear, this is now a poem about the speaker’s efforts to lighten up and quit that gloomy “fore bemoaned moan” — look on the bright side of life!

The side-bar really catches one’s eye, although it’s easy to miss at first glance.  I don’t mean the vocabulary clarifications.  (Although clarifying “my dear time’s waste” as “the damages that time has done to things dear to me” is a reductive paraphrase that damages a student’s possible interpretations of connotations of the word ‘waste,’ all of which were known to Shakespeare.  Shakespeare’s line is thus stripped of the potential power of its ambiguous phrasing.)

But disappointment with oversimplification aside, the real problem with the side bar is an accompanying photograph, meant as some sort of illustration, but of what I am not sure.

It’s a photograph, depicting a middle-aged couple, man and woman, of Asiatic descent, standing close, their tilted heads touching, both wearing glasses, and smiling broadly, showing sets of perfect teeth.  They are somewhat plump and seem quite content.  They stand, in what appears to be a summer’s garden, above a bouquet of yellow flowers of uncertain variety (the photograph has that old Kodak gloss, yet lacks detail in the focus).  The couple are clearly from the late 20th or early 21st century — there’s no attempt to dress them in Elizabethan drag.  There is no caption beneath the photograph explaining who they are or what their appearance might possibly have to do with Shakespeare’s Sonnet 30.

So why are they here?  Putting on my semiotician’s cap, let me try to give it a read.  Bear in mind that with that cap on, I must consider the significance of the whole page, from introduction to final questions at the bottom.

The first thing we notice is that the focus of the poem is a text by William Shakespeare.  If we juxtapose that with an image of a contemporary Asiatic couple, one of the first notions that can occur to us is to remember the legendary resilience and wide-spread appeal with which, in this culture, we are expected to associate with Shakespeare.  How better to emphasize that Shakespeare has a ‘timeless’ appeal to all peoples than with a picture of cheerfully receptive people not of his time nor of his culture.  (Actually, there are many better ways to do this, but one admits the cleverness here — the designer of the page makes this emphasis without words needing to express it.)

Since the couple are standing so close together, one easily recognizes them as ‘friends.’  Surely then they represent the kind of social connectivity Shakespeare reveals in the last two lines of his poem?  Aren’t friends good to have?  Look how cheerful being friends makes this couple.  Not only do “sorrows end,” they’re nowhere to be found.  As R. Kelly recently sang on Happy People, “Put a smile on your face/ And make a friend.”  It’s nice to discover that great poets from such different backgrounds can express the same thought in different words.

Which leads me to the big idea that I think this page is trying to convey: some variant of the notion that Shakespeare, so feared among the young for the difficulties of his texts, is really as understandable (and as harmless) as a common greeting card.  Because take away the Introduction, the notes, the final question, and that’s pretty much what we have here.    And the Introduction, the notes, the final questions, rather than challenge that notion, are clearly intended to support it.  Not by simply coming out and saying it, of course.  The pandering, the over-simplification, the banality would be much too obvious.  So the words instead strip the text of its latent power, its ambiguity in phrasing, the emotional resonance of its final lines, and let the designer’s photograph do the rest.

Am I being too hard on those involved?  I’ll begin to consider that when I get a cogent and reasonable explanation of what that picture is doing there.  Because even if the above was not the intended message, that is surely one possible — indeed, one probable — message one can get from the signs on the page.

It can also be argued (and I think the authors here would argue) that I fail to recognize the appeal to readers who have differing levels of competence in reading at the high school level.  I understand that we have at last realized that the different needs of different readers have to be addressed.  What I don’t see, however, is why this needs to be done with a sonnet by Shakespeare.    Are we trying to sneak Shakespeare in through the back door, leading students to believe they are reading Shakespeare when what they have is something that only exists as constructed by the authors of the notes and designer of the page with that dreadful photograph?  Or are they really reassuring the student that, once they grasp the fundamentals of literacy, they need think no more on Shakespeare than they do on a greeting card?

I think that’s really what’s going on here.  Elements of Literature, from stem to stern, reassures its intended student audience  that the primary purpose of literature is its use as a tool for mastering skills — e.g., for learning how to write a resume, give a speech in public, or justify one’s movie choices.   And of course, to pass tests.  There is little in this book that truly suggests that reading literature can be a pleasure; that it can enrich one’s experience; that it carries cultural codes from generation to generation, commenting on the human condition as it changes across time.  It’s a big, heavy book that tells students that literature is hard work, but once they get through it, they will have developed skills, after which they won’t have to bother with it again.   What they have read, they can then forget.

Because certainly, if I had to work my way through this book as a student, assuming I’d had little experience with literature previously, there’s no doubt that I would simply read the cues as to what I am expected to write on the exams, and completely forget any of the morass of literary texts presented.  Trying to remember particular texts from the book would be like trying to remember the differing doors of a house flying by in a tornado.   It’s a jumbled mess of words, images, history, unexamined ideas and lost opportunities for richer, more edifying discussion, anchored only by the ruthlessly repetitive instructions on how to pass the PSSA.

I admit it’s likely that the book was offered to school districts as a resource, with individual teachers allowed to assign what sections they wished (as long as the majority of their students continued to pass the PSSA).  But that misses my point.  The very size and shape of the book, its design, the repetitive instructions on how to pass the test, all contribute to its essential message.  It would be very difficult to read anything in this book and learn to love it, or even become interested in it,  Opening the enormous tome and looking down at the glare of its glossy pages is physically stressful.

It is true that I came to literature quite young; when I was twelve I read through The Deerslayer, the Iliad and the Odyssey (Rouse translations), and Goldfinger (well, okay, we all have our guilty pleasures).  But it is also true that in my junior high school, while students clearly read at different levels, the books provided at the differing levels were still identifiably literary in quality.  The Honors class got to read Catcher in the Rye, the Basics class got Herman Wouk’s City Boy.  By 9th grade Social Studies, we were reading Plato, Volatire, Hardy, Orwell, Steinbeck; most students had read a Shakespearean play or seen one performed.   (In 1968, Zefferelli’s Romeo and Juliet had proven quite popular among young people.)

It is also true that the literature anthologies I knew in my youth, even those available in freshman college English, could be imposingly large, with editorial material and commentary that were dreadfully dull, even stultifying.  But they were just text, on plain paper, with many complete works that were clearly literary in quality and with an identifiable time line and cultural narrative.  And no pictures of smiling couples.  They were real books containing texts from other books and existed therefore in the realm of books; in a culture that valued books.

I don’t know at which grade level Elements of Literature is targeted, but at one point, the students are reminded that “You probably have been taking standardized tests throughout your school career,” and they should be thinking about going to college.  Again, this book is from 2007.  I tried to verify whether it is still being used in Pennsylvania, but the Pennsylvania government and education websites are difficult to navigate or search. [5]  What I did find out is that the PSSA is currently only administered in grades 3 through 8, with a follow-up in the 11th grade.   I also sampled some curricula from Pennsylvania school districts. [6]  Notably, the only course in English with a sustained emphasis on reading literary texts, in their complete book format, is the Grade 12 Advanced Placement course, intended for those expected not only to go to college, but possibly also to succeed there.

Now, there is nothing in and of itself offensive about teaching “English Language Arts” rather than English literature.  It might be best, our culture as fragmented as it is these days, to let students, once taught to read, find their own way to the literature of their choice.  What’s appalling about this whole experience with the Elements of Literature is the duplicity involved and the ugliness of its presentation, overwhelming because of the bureaucratic regulations requiring it.  Literature is not literature, it’s a tool.  English literature will not be taught, but there will be “exposure” to Beowulf and Shakespeare.  Reading and writing are not about ideas or emotions, but about passing tests.  There’s no fundamental difference between literature, comic books, movies or political speeches.  And should a student find any problem with this, they’ll fail the test.  This isn’t education, it’s indoctrination.

But what makes it even worse is that it’s not indoctrination in a way that makes any sense.  Because students are not really being taught the language arts, they’re not really being guided toward success in college or in professions (or simply in jobs).  And they’re certainly not being “exposed” to literature, so much as they are being driven away from it.  They are being taught how to take a test.  The only lesson they learn and can carry away and use throughout life, is to submit to authority, and use whatever means, regardless of value, that will help them “get ahead” —  i.e. pass whatever test life presents as obstacle to their success.   “What forms do I fill out in order to get that new car?” is the kind of question this book prepares students to ask.

Which is weird, because when literature and books really were of value, we not only found such questions fairly easy to ask, we didn’t see any need to set literature aside in order to ask them.  But that’s what the student readers of Elements of Literature are being taught: that literature is an impediment to overcome, in order to get to the ‘real’ questions in life, like how to negotiate a car purchase.

There was a time when books, cars, political speeches, film, history, all formed strands of the great web of life, without mistaking any one for any of the others.  There was no reason to dispense with one in order to enjoy the others.  Now everything is everything, and nothing matters — except “getting ahead.”  There’s just nothing anymore, beyond bare survival and hedonistic pleasure, which seems to give that any value.

Notes

[1] Elements of Literature Sixth Course Essentials of British and World Literature.  Pennsylvania Edition.  No author designation on title pages.  Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 2007.

[2] I move we expunge the word ‘awesome’ from the English language forthwith.

[3] As one of my teachers once put it, “A classic is a text written by someone who’s dead.”

[4] William Shakespeare, Sonnet 30:

When to the sessions of sweet silent thought

I summon up remembrance of things past,

I sigh the lack of many a thing I sought,

And with old woes new wail my dear time’s waste:

Then can I drown an eye, unus’d to flow,

For precious friends hid in death’s dateless night,

And weep afresh love’s long since cancell’d woe,

And moan the expense of many a vanish’d sight:

Then can I grieve at grievances foregone,

And heavily from woe to woe tell o’er

The sad account of fore-bemoaned moan,

Which I new pay as if not paid before.

But if the while I think on thee, dear friend,

All losses are restor’d and sorrows end.

[5] For instance:  http://www.education.pa.gov/Pages/default.aspx#tab-1

[6 ] For instance:  http://www.basd.net/Page/8914

Heidegger’s Illusions

by E. John Winner

1.

In 1934, shortly after the infamous murder spree of the Blood Purge, Hitler delivered a speech before the Reichstag. Referring to an unspecified threat to himself – and thus to the government, and thus to the German nation, and thus to the German people – Hitler announced that in initiating the murders of the leadership of the Brownshirts, the leadership of the Berlin National Socialist organization, a handful of “left-wing” politicians, and a couple of minor recalcitrant old-guard military figures – he had become identical with the self-preservation of the German people, their will, and their law. According to all the opinion polling data at the time, the German people either agreed or acquiesced. This effectively ended the legitimacy of the government of Germany. If a single man’s will can be said to be the law, then there is no law; no autonomous standard of regulation by which individual behaviors may be judged. Only Hitler’s word kept a nation called “Germany” together as a political entity. The conceptualized entity, “the State,” is an invention of theory, agreed to (even if only by acquiescence) by the participants, and when it reduces to nothing but power, it is powerless as an idea. Adolf Hitler identified Germany with his own body, his own thought, and his own will, and the German people allowed him to do so. What theory of the State could correspond with this?

“The state exists,” wrote Martin Heidegger in his Introduction to Metaphysics, only a year after the historic moment when the German state had ceased to exist as anything other than a vehicle for the will of Adolf Hitler. [1] As Heidegger began to realize his disappointment with political events in Hitler’s Germany, did he have any idea how powerless his thinking was in relation to those events? Did he not see that events were reducing his address to them to parody? The nation within which these events occured – inhabited, Heidegger asserts, by the world’s “most spiritual people” – was everywhere falling into the barbarism that has at its command the forces of Modern technology; the same technological regimentation of Modern life for which Heidegger denounces America and the Soviet Union, but threatening the very existence of the world; not some metaphysical “world-order,” but the world of living people. But Heidegger preferred to tease the essence of Being out of a state facing an existential threat from its own leadership.

Given that the Introduction to Metaphysics is a lecture given in an academic setting, it is easy to read Heidegger’s questioning of the ontology of the state and presume that whatever he says following a question, will constitute an answer to the question. But what if Heidegger is actually asking himself questions, e.g.: “What is the state of National Socialist Germany? Can such be even referred to as a state? Where am I situated if the state is not; that is, the state no longer is what is claimed for it, the legitimate institution of government by law for the community of Germany?” How did whatever it was that Heidegger took to be the promise of National Socialism deliver Germany into nihilism? Heidegger seems to be trying desperately to raise the question of Being, only because the “essence” of National Socialism amounts to nothing.

2.

There is not nothing in Heidegger’s infamous “Nothing.” Nor is it something. Nor is it negation. It is the absence of Being. There is, for Heidegger, certainly, a National Socialist government, but where the being of the state is sought, we find only the absence of essence, the lack of Being, that is, the Nothing – certainly nothing of the essence that was sought.

However, Heidegger seems to want to say that there is an essence of National Socialism, not found as a national state, clearly, but rather as the “spirit” of a movement in history. The Introduction to Metaphysics is an attempt to raise that issue indirectly, as a questioning of Being, in order to raise the being of National Socialism that, in the event, never emerged in history, but only as a “spirit” in this text. Heidegger tells us precisely what he identifies as this “spirit,” when he quotes from his notorious “Rektoratsrede” of 1933, to the effect that ‘spirit’ can be defined as an informed will to discover the essence of Being. It is the “will to power” as will-to-truth; a will to express truth historically. One hears echoes of Nietzsche here, obviously, yet there is more. In another well-known passage, where Heidegger writes of the dissolution of the European “spirit” as a whole, he remarks that they proved unworthy of the greatness of German Idealism.

I suspect that what Heidegger expected from National Socialism was a resurrection of the lively culture engendered by the “nation” of “Dichter und Denker” (as Germans liked to think of themselves occasionally), as it existed and promised to become when that culture was dominated by the thought of the German Idealists. But as something of a Nietzschean, Heidegger also wanted this culture to avail itself of all the resources enjoyed by any Modern culture – and to produce new cultural resources as well. This would require a new generation of poets and thinkers who would establish the grounds of knowledge in the new era they would bring forth – possibly by accepting the completion of Western metaphysics by the German Idealists themselves, while correcting the misdirection of Western metaphysics as a whole, literally from the ground up. The German philosophers would at last have an opportunity to get to the source of all philosophy, and, effectively start from scratch. Heidegger appears to have believed that it would be National Socialism that would provide this opportunity.

Unfortunately, the National Socialists chose not to do this. Instead, Heidegger was left to lecture on metaphysics, while wondering why National Socialism would not do this. Why have such a sudden diremption in history presented to a people, as a moment for rethinking the whole of their culture and its destiny, just so they could adopt the industrialism of Russia and America and the technological regimentation that came with it?

When writing of “revolution” and “our revolution,” Heidegger may be referring to the event of German Idealism. That promise had been made by writers like Kant and Hegel, and never realized: the promise Heidegger himself identified with National Socialism, but with which the Nazis themselves never identified; the promise embedded in the text of Introduction to Metaphysics, present in the occasional tone of bitter disappointment, expressions of a deep anxiety over the Nothing of the new era of National Socialism.

Concerning much of our discussion here, Hans Sluga has contributed a cogent interpretation. [2] Heidegger’s own understanding of his relationship with National Socialism, which he reads as a relationship to “historical Being,” was clearly very confused. It is also clear that Martin Heidegger adopted National Socialism in 1933 precisely because he had not the slightest idea what that movement was about. Heidegger was not able to conceive the real historical situation in which he found himself. The phenomenon Heidegger’s text labels “National Socialism” happens to be wholly imaginary, a fantastic fictionalization of history. And this fiction was not derived in opposition to traditional philosophy, but from it, as mythopoesis of certain tendencies in the texts of German Idealism, as implicated in the published readings of those texts available to Heidegger in the Germany of his time.

As Sluga points out, Heidegger’s argument against Modernity pivots on an insistence that the re-interpretation of “spirit,” as produced and dispersed by Modernist theorists has degraded the inherent nobility of the “spirit” by reading it as a form of intelligence, a tool, a value, an aesthetic. But the discourse of Modernity regarding “spirit” is not a re-interpretation of anything. It in fact forms the context from which the text of what Moderns know as “spirit” was produced. This notion of “spirit” is an invention of Modern discourse (especially that of German Idealism), clearly intended to replace Classical and Medieval discourse concerning “the intellective soul,” the generative locus of reason that identifies the human from other forms of animal life. Unfortunately, the German Idealists tended to get carried away by the rhetoricity of their own discourse. The term appears to have been set in motion as a trope for an ambiguous theoretical model; e.g., although Hegel’s attempted rendition in the Phenomenology is adequate, its dialectical presentation leaves considerable room for variant readings. But it soon became reified into a nebulous something-or-other that was made to appear, in deus-ex-machina fashion, whenever an a priori authority for a theoretical axiom was needed to justify a line of argument. (Here I am thankful to Jacques Derrida’s reading of Heidegger’s “Rektoratsrede,”) [3]

As the discourse of the “Spirit” was developed precisely to these ends, the “spirit” can only label an intelligence, a tool, a value, an aesthetic – these are its historic and originary significations. Heidegger was clearly blinded by the hypostatic quality of such discourse into accepting such reification as a given: Dasein (loosely, Human Being) realizes its essence through its historical encounter with Being, which thus brings Being into disclosure historically as truth. This essence is its “spirit.” But such yet remains assertion; the ground remains ungrounded.

For Heidegger, the “spirit” of National Socialism should have been the realization of Dasein’s encounter with Being in history. But he has hitched this hope to a creaky wagon full of illusions: that the German Idealists had resurfaced an historically determined truth from the ancient Greeks, signified as “spirit,” which in fact was their own construction; that this supposed re-surfacing had in itself provided the German people an opportunity to realize ancient truths in a new form; that this opportunity effectively centralized Germany as the special locus of important historical change, ushering in a new age of thinking, of poetic encounter with Being, or cultural creativity promised but unfulfilled in Western metaphysics; that there could even be a “National Socialism” different from that of Adolf Hitler’s. Heidegger has introduced us to metaphysics, but his anxiety that all his hope might be grounded in illusion (evident in the bitterness of his social commentary, in his ironic self-reflection) has revealed the nothingness of the National Socialist state, the inherent nihilism grounding its industrially driven construction, predetermined to realize itself in death camps and world war. In 1935, it was poignant to ask “Why is there Being rather than Nothing,” because the German people were nearing the political abyss of the Nothing of historical obliteration.

Heidegger himself raises the issue, under the rubric of “appearance.” Unfortunately, his discourse on appearance is itself misguided. What Heidegger wants from appearance as a presentation of Being is two-fold. First, he needs to acknowledge that appearance can be deceptive, as everyone knows; thus it should provide a standard of judgment as to its own veracity. But Heidegger also wants appearance to be useful for engendering an encounter with Being. But how do we know when appearance is leading us toward being, and when it is misleading, as illusion? Heidegger does not provide us with guidance.

Let us think of the sun. Every day it rises and sets for us. Only a very few astronomers, physicists, philosophers – and even they only on the basis of a specialized approach which may be more or less widespread – experience this state of affairs otherwise, namely as a motion of the earth around the sun. But the appearance in which sun and earth stand, e.g. the early morning landscape, the sea in the evening, the night, is a appearing. This appearance is not nothing. Nor is it untrue. Nor is it a mere appearance of conditions in nature which are really otherwise. This appearance is historical and it is history, discovered and grounded in poetry and myth and thus an essential area of our world.

Only the tired latecomers with their supercilious wit imagine that they can dispose of the historical power of appearance by declaring it to be ‘subjective,’ hence very dubious. The Greeks experience it differently. They were perpetually compelled to wrest being from appearance and preserve it against appearance. (The essence of being is un-concealment.)

This is a decisive moment in Heidegger’s text, which we can call “the parable of the sun.” What Heidegger wants from this parable is evidence that the common perception of the sun “rising” in the East and “setting” in the West contains a truth within it, the truth of sensory knowledge, from which the ancient Greeks communally wrested the truth of their experience with Being, in a history-making, poetic manner. The conceptual and mathematical description of the earth in its double rotation – on its axis and around the sun – is simply not as close to Being as the undeniable, visually ascertainable appearance of the sun ‘moving’ toward, then behind, the horizon to the west at dusk. Heidegger is not dismissing the knowledge discoverable in mathematics and astronomy. He is simply saying that the truths of these sciences will not get us any closer to the being of the sun as we experience it, than contemplating it at dusk as an essential existence revealed to our thought.

But this line of thought is troubled by problems both internal and external. As an example, at one point Heidegger notes that it is difficult to sense the double rotation of the earth, to be there in it, which would be required such that one could look at the sun and encounter it in its essence as the star around which the earth moves. This seems, at first, difficult – but it may be possible to imagine an entire culture generated around the experience of the earth’s double rotation and perceiving the sun in this fashion. But if even a “gut feeling” of the earth’s double rotation is possible (further supported with reasoning and evidence), why would we want to affirm the old notion of the sun revolving around the earth, as anything other than myth and poetry? There is a point in the development of all learning where a knower accomplishes a knowledge that cannot be unlearned. The reason why we can never return to the Ptolemaic universe is because we have accumulated an enormous quantity of internalized discourse explaining why Ptolemy was wrong. This discourse includes mathematical proofs and astronomical models, but it also now includes poems, philosophy texts and even the testimony of contemporary farmers. It is not that the visual imprint of the sun “rising” and “setting” is wrong, and it is certainly not nonsense. It’s simply no longer necessary to see it in this way, and it is now impossible for us to agree that such an appearance is the truth of our experience of the sun.

Truth, even scientific truth, but also the truth of immediate experience, is historically determined, just as Heidegger says it is. But this only means that the wise and courageous act to perform here is not the embrace of promised radical change in the future, but the acceptance of change as it has already occurred. The sun does not “set.” It never has. Theories implicating double rotation were actually in play in ancient Greece and Egypt, but the early Christians discredited and suppressed them. The actual visual appearance of the sun is a matter of complete indifference. Our knowledge will tell us what to see and how to see it. If it is the duty of philosophers, poets, and other thinkers to provide alternative perceptions, other possible knowledges and ways of knowing – and I believe Heidegger would agree that this is right – then we must always begin with what is presently known, in our own language now, and not seek revival of older usages long debunked. The history of knowledge – our history, our knowledge – will not allow it as anything other than a nostalgic glance backward. What can be said of an appearance is precisely what can be known of it, nothing more.

3.

Heidegger says of anxiety that it arises when matters appear to us as though wholly unknown. I agree that this anxiety allows us an opportunity to learn what we did not know before. But profound, uncontrollable, enduring and unendurable anxiety is simply panic, and no one learns in a state of panic. Confusion everywhere reduces human response outside of the thoughtful and down to the level of primate fear and aggression. Such was exactly what Adolf Hitler was counting on politically, in the historical condition of an impoverished Germany in the early ’30s.

The Ptolemaic model of the universe was part and parcel of an ideology. It was false. Our current conception of the universe is part of the ideology of Modernity. It may, in the future, prove false. But this does not mean we cannot now trust it to be true. Ideology just is the logic of the ideas one has in mind, true or false. But when an ideology moves a populace to harm others, or themselves, we should consider it with extreme caution and suspicion.

What Heidegger seems to want to say in Introduction to Metaphysics, is that National Socialists certainly manipulated false appearances in order to bring about unpleasant political change, but that we should look to those appearances to discover a truth that, if properly noticed, thought, decided and acted upon, could at last bring forth a breach in history, a poetic encounter with Being; a deeper spirituality. Not any of this is true. Mein Kampf does not need a close reading to reveal Hitler’s project for a permanent condition of pan-European war, enslavement, oppression, anti-Semitic violence, and vicious intra-governmental squabbles leading to execution (or simply murder). [4] If Hitler had chosen a path to power that was simply a manipulation of appearances, an obvious deception of the German people, he would never have written Mein Kampf.

What appears to have happened for Heidegger, is that the appearance he thought the National Socialists presented – a revival of German Idealism – was only what he wanted from them. Beyond the texts of Heidegger and a handful of conservative intellectuals in correspondence with him, there exists no evidence that the National Socialists had any desire to bring forth such a revival. They didn’t even think reference to that era of German thought useful for propaganda purposes. This supposed promised revival of German Idealism was an invention of Heidegger’s inner ideology. He imposed it on the culture of National Socialism in order to find a place for himself within it. Despair in the face of growing evidence that the National Socialists had no interest in this was inevitable.

For the German Idealists themselves, the world as appearance, as imposed by us on the world through our reason, could be guaranteed, not by blindly accepting knowledge just as given, not by allowing ‘gut feelings’ and intuition to guide us to dramatic encounters with being or poetic disruptions of history; but by rectifying the reasoning by which knowledge is known; through which Being is encountered; according to which we must negotiate history as it actually happens. Philosophy is about understanding, it’s not about effecting revolutionary change.

Heidegger wanted the important question to be, “Why is there Being, rather than Nothing?” But that turns out not to be the question. Despite his remarks on Sartre, the “Letter on Humanism” (1946), Heidegger’s thinking always really concerned the question: What is it to be human? [5]  Raising such questions and thinking them through is the task of philosophy. Heidegger love wisdom. If ultimately, he could not find it, and even for a time allowed politics to mislead him away from it, it is because he forgot to seek it in the one place it ever finds its home, the mind of the rational animal.

Notes

[1] Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans R. Manheim. Doubleday, 1961.

[2] Hans Sluga, “Conflict is the Father of All Things,” in A Companion to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, R. Polt and G. Fried, eds.; Yale, 2001.

[3] Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question; G. Bennington and R. Bowlby, trans.; U. Chicago, 1989.

[4] Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, R. Manheim, trans.; Houghton Mifflin, 1943.

[5] Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, F. A. Capuzzi with J. G. Gray D, trans.; D. F. Krell, ed.; HarperCollins, 1993.

Hitler’s Rant: The Efficacy of a Modern Rhetoric

by E. John Winner

With Mein Kampf in the news recently, we’ll here consider two rhetorical strategies found in Hitler’s text.  The first targets the well-known anxieties of Hitler’s expected audience.  The second finds Hitler identifying with his audience or rather, a particular segment of that audience, the young and rebellious.  Hopefully, the reading will reveal something about the people who supported Hitler’s rise to power, as well as about the nature of Modern culture.

  1. Appealing to the audience

As a sign of (the Jews’) growing presumption and sense of security, a certain section of them openly and impudently proclaim their Jewish nationality while another section hypocritically pretend that they are German, French or English as the case may be. Their blatant behaviour in their relations with other people shows how clearly they envisage their day of triumph in the near future.  The black-haired Jewish youth lies in wait for hours on end, satanically glaring at and spying on the unsuspicious girl whom he plans to seduce, adulterating her blood and removing her from the bosom of her own people. [1]

Mein Kampf is replete in passages that seem to begin almost reasonably, only to swell emotively into tides of loathing that as verbal expression could only be called a rant; furious polemics filled with invective and name-calling, promising doom to many assorted opponents, real or imaginary.  Given the volcanic wrath spewed in his speeches, the rant is probably the rhetorical form with which most people identify with Hitler.

Yet there’s a curious banality to many of Hitler’s rants. Most scholars find them horrifying, with justification, given their targets and topics, and given their practical effect on the German people which was disastrous. Yet, as instances or examples of this kind of polemic, many are disappointing.

The major source of this disappointment is a lack of invention.  To threaten his readers with “the black-haired Jewish youth” who “lies in wait” for “the unsuspicious girl whom he plans to seduce” may be offensive, but it’s hardly new, as far as racist rhetoric is concerned.  Hitler could have quoted these phrases from many of the anti-Semitic tracts of his own time – or those distributed in the previous century [2].

A good rant, to achieve its power, ought to catch us off guard, with striking metaphors, vigorous turns of phrase, and an inner logic that so strips our experience of social negotiation and compromise that the rant passes for a flash of insight into a reality that, at least briefly, we are persuaded we have hitherto denied.  In place of this, Hitler often gives us worn-out clichés, propelled only by a smug contempt, the target of which may be the subject of his rant, but might easily be his audience.

Consider the sexually predatory “Jewish youth” ‘lying in wait’ we’re threatened with.  Not only is he a stock figure of racist propaganda, but more to the point, he isn’t even emblematic of what Hitler himself fears and hates about Jews.  Hitler rarely showed interest in the threat of inter-racial sex.  (Or sex at all – his rage against prostitution, for example, seems to do with the totalitarian’s fear that sex cannot be controlled. [3]) Rather, his anxiety involves a seeming dilemma: We ought to expect humans as embodiments of their given race to behave as expected for that race – but they don’t.  Hitler’s resolution is identification of genetics and culture – a dialectical resolution of the problem of nature versus nurture: the two will be made one.  Thus Hitler’s claim to have founded a ‘scientific’ racialism, one predicated on a clarification of the very notion of race, as a necessary category determinant of our existence.  Race, being what we are, should determine what we do: genetics should determine culture.

It is a fundamental principle of Hitler’s thinking that nature’s grand plan is a struggle for racial dominance.[4] This means that race determines the behavior of a person, in contributing to the dominance of his race – unless mislead by the deceptive behavior of those of an inferior race, working to further their own struggle for dominance.  Genetics as ontology: to be true to Nature, culture must express race. When it doesn’t, it’s but a corrupt pantomime, deluding us.

When people of different races act similarly – sharing the same culture – therefore, it must be an exercise in deception.  The member of the inferior race capable of this deception, then, must be the one to fear – especially in Hitler’s universe, where the genetic ontology realizes itself through conflict between the differing races. [5]  In such a universe, it is the intellectual Jew who is dangerous.

The Jewish intellectual is, for Hitler, the ‘genetically advanced’ Jew, the ‘pure’ Jew, and so the bearer, propagator, and representative of Jewish culture at its most developed.  But for Hitler, Jewish culture is inherently parasitical.  This means that Jews express their culture’s greatest development by mimicking other cultures, with devious intent.  The Jewish intellectual can pass for a non-Jew, but, presumably, it is a ploy in the ongoing effort to achieve global hegemony for Jewish culture.  The Jewish intellectual is thus the tandard-bearer against whom Hitler judges himself and his own struggle for the ‘Aryan’ cause.

So much for the “Jewish youth lying in wait” in Hitler’s rant.  Hitler doesn’t care about sex, only about race.  Threatening the “unsuspicious girl” who is the object, presumably, of audience sympathy – is mere pandering. When Hitler resorts to clichés and stock figures, he addresses an audience that he believes cannot think through the metaphysics of race as he has and who will greet the appropriate clichés with the expected response – as so many have before. [6] The cynical manipulation of that audience is clear.  The sharper members of the audience should have seen the pandering for what it was.  While in print this strategy seems hackneyed, when delivered oratorically it proved quite effective.  Why?

There is no use apologizing for the audience.  They gave in to the pandering, the cheap theatrics, and one of the most talented orators of recent memory.  They preferred suasion to reasoned thought and are, without doubt, culpable.  It must be remembered that the success of Hitler’s anti-Semitic rhetoric depended largely on the popularity of anti-Semitism in Germany at the time.  No rhetoric succeeds if it does not express something – an idea, an aspiration, an emotion – that a receptive audience wants to hear.  The clichés and stock figures are already in the minds of the audience, so however intellectually weak Hitler’s rants are, when they play upon these clichés and on the anxieties they evoke, they tap into the relevant consciousness.  Otherwise, his speeches could not have resonated in the ways they did.

  1. Identifying with the audience

A resort to manipulation is not the only strategy Hitler has at his command.  Consider a passage from his condemnation of the Volkisch movement that preceded and prepared the way for the popularization of Hitler’s fanatical nationalism. [7]  It seems odd to find Hitler condemning this movement, since he would utilize many Volkisch ideas and symbols in his propaganda campaigns for National Socialism.  But the Volkisch movement was primarily a cultural revolution with political overtones.  Hitler’s revolution was truly totalitarian, driven by a holistic vision that was concerned with far more than simply changing people’s attitudes.  Still, one might expect Hitler would make distinctions between the older movement and his own, in a manner respectful of his precursors.  At worst, we might expect a mild rebuke to the older movement for being outdated or unfocused.  Instead, we get this:

Anyone who fights for a so-called idea without being able to bring about even the slightest success, in fact without having prevented the victory of the opposite, has, with forty years activity, provided proof of his own capacity.  The danger above all lies in the fact that such natures do not fit into the movement as links but keep shooting off their mouths about leading circles in which alone, on the strength of their age-old activity, they can see a suitable place for further activity.  But woe betide if a young movement is surrendered to the mercies of such people.  No more than a business man who in forty years of activity has steadily run a big business to the ground is fitted to be founder of a new one, is a folkish Methuselah, who in exactly the same time has gummed up and petrified a great idea, fit for leadership of a new, young movement! [8]

The tone of this rant is absolutist and unforgiving, enlivened only minimally with the parodic figure of the “folkish Methuselah” gumming up “a great idea.”  At a superficial level, the charge against the Volkisch leaders appears to be that they haven’t made any serious efforts to advance the nationalist cause, preferring to remain socially cloistered in small sects.  There is even a latent charge that they’ve aided the enemies of nationalism, if only through the weakness and mismanagements of their efforts.  Argumentatively, the evidence Hitler offers for these charges is empirical – forty years of Volkisch efforts have not led to victory; indeed, anti-nationalist forces are in the ascendency.  The conclusion is unstated but quite clear: the Volkisch leaders should stand aside, and allow those more able to fight to do so.

But beneath this argument, we hear the expression of a rage of youth against an older generation.  The asserted forty year period of Volkisch activity is actually a rough approximation (its roots reach back considerably farther).  Yet Hitler fastens on it obsessively, repeating it like the toll of a bell: “Forty years… forty years… forty years of activity….”  And all for nothing, apparently. It is well to remember that Hitler was thirty-five when he wrote these lines, a mere half-decade from that magic year.

‘Activity’ is a key term here.  Had the Volkisch leaders simply sat around writing nationalist tracts and muttering incantations in pseudo-Teutonic rituals, Hitler may not have bothered with them.  But they actually did engage in political activity, even forming the Deutschnationale Volkspartei; for a while a major rival of the NSDAP for Rightist sympathies.

Hitler is expressing a very Modern frustration.  Ought not activity produce results? Of course, there are other ways of conceiving the purpose of human life.  But a conviction that human value lies in the productivity of our actions, is widespread among Moderns, to this day.  Science and technology are often the first reference for this conviction.  Indeed, so productive has modern science proven, that we can no longer think of productivity without also thinking of technology, which is the concrete manifestation of it.  But productivity only really became the telos to Modern life when technology’s productivity could be monetized.  The development of an industrial economy effectively determined a human teleology that is difficult to resist.  After all, even to survive in Modern culture means surviving as an economic agent.  And economic agents produce.

So Hitler’s charge, that the activity of the Volkisch leadership has not produced results cuts deep.  The analogy of the failed businessman is all to the point.  No effort ought to be more productive than that of a commercial enterprise, the sole purpose of which is to produce wealth.  What then to do with a failed businessman, too old to be productive?  In Hitler’s harsh universe of final and absolute ‘either/or’ decisions, only death would be a logically coherent alternative. [9]

That’s not pandering, it’s audience identification; not with the rude masses, but with the restless young.

Hitler is demanding results, and in this, he is one with his audience.  Who pays attention to political saviors who offer no change?  Only this time, nothing less than complete success will do.  That is Hitler’s promise.  Beneath it lies a web of unspoken fears concerning potential failure; activity without result might in this case produce the direst consequences.  Without such fears, Hitler cannot make the promise seem challenging enough to be attractive – cannot make it risky enough to be worth the gamble.  More to the point, he otherwise cannot make his activity seem active enough.  The more at stake, the greater the effort.  As long as the stakes are high enough, his audience will rise to the challenge. Hitler’s own anxiety about possible failure, revealed in the urgency of his language, forms the binding contract of his promise.

But let’s return to a previous point for emphasis.  The frustration Hitler is voicing in this passage is not only frustration with the failed activity of the Volkisch leaders, born of fears of his own possible failure.  It is also the frustration of a young man horrified by the increasing complacency of his elders.  As a boy, Hitler had read cowboy novels, adventure stories filled with life-or-death struggles, as well as popular histories about bold, world-shaping movements led by men of genius and courage.  Yet he found himself enmeshed in a political movement dominated by older men who preferred talk of revolution to participation in one (hence the lack of their support for the ’23 Putsch, the failure of which led to Hitler’s imprisonment).  So they “shoot their mouths off” to maintain their leadership, but don’t make the effort necessary to further their cause.  Hitler, still a young man (but not getting any younger), has joined the movement to effect real change, to shape the course of history, to engage in a life or death struggle for what he perceives to be a great cause.  Of course he’s going to feel frustrated with the Volkisch leaders.  They seem to him nothing more than obstacles, who first must be overcome to further the revolution.

There is fear behind this frustration as well.  To put it simply, Hitler is afraid that history is passing him by.  If life is activity and activity must produce results, then the failure of activity to produce results constitutes a failure to live.  Beneath this rant, then, lies a desperate, propelling urge to live.

To some extent, it’s a story with which we should be familiar.  We see it in the aggressiveness and cockiness of young football players; in the anxiety of young poets and musicians; in the earnestness of young political activists, of every persuasion; in the passion of young religious converts.  Do we not oft hear from them a similar caustic disregard – for maturity, for the caution that comes with age and experience, for the acceptance of the complexity and difficulty of human reality?  Surely, hostility to all of this is what is meant by the old phrase, “the impatience of youth.”  What youth is impatient for is a life filled with purposive (productive) activity.  Yet it often seems to the young that all the older generations can offer them is – old age.

It should be born in mind that Hitler was a man who never outgrew his adolescence.  Here he is, at the age of thirty-five, writing an adolescent’s rant.  During the war, he referred to the Russians as “Redskins,” as though still experiencing the cowboy novels of his early years. [10]

From the perspective of an adolescent, fearful that maturation only brings about old age, the productive moment is always now – the day, the moment, when all things become new.  Was not the German Reich born of a single day’s battle at Sedan?

The fury and frustration of youth is born of the fear that “now” will pass with nothing accomplished.  A youth might read of, say, Martin Luther, and believe that if Luther hadn’t broken with the Roman church exactly when he did, he could not have initiated the Reformation; or might read of Galileo believing that, had the moment when he rebelled against the older knowledge been lost, the new could never have developed.  Those before them, in older traditions, surely only posed obstacles to overcome on the way to making history.

And for those for whom history is always a matter of struggles for dominance – where the stakes are high, there’s not a moment to lose.  This is, of course, a glaring misreading of history.  But it is common enough among young people, eager to make their mark on the world.  So the appeal of many revolutionary movements has been to something young in us: that sense of urgency, of the need to accomplish great things – now.

This has become stock in trade in Modern rhetoric.  Think of all the political tracts and economic projects, the manifestos promising great changes in the arts, the sciences, in education; think of the various cultural revolutions of the past two hundred years.  Every generation now claims a right to its own voice; no voices of the past will do.

In the passage at hand, Hitler is claiming this right and is implying even more.  As the fury of his rant suggests, he himself is the voice of the new generation, the “young movement,” the nationalist revolution in Germany.  The old Volkisch leaders merely “‘shoot off their mouths.”  Hitler, by contrast, speaks.

—–

[1] Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (hereafter MK), 1925; Trans. James Murphy; Hurst and Blackett (London), 1939; page 254.

[2] I could reproduce swaths of racist cant for comparison; but the style should be familiar enough, still in use in our own day.

[3] The discussion goes on a while in MK Volume One, Chapter 10, “Why the Second Reich Collapsed.”

[4]  See Hitler’s discussions in MK, Volume One, Chapter 11, “Nation and Race,” and Volume Two, Chapter 1, “Philosophy and Party.”

[5] See MK Volume Two, Chapter 2, “The State.”

[6] Every now and then, Hitler’s contempt for the German people leaks out.  Regarding his co-workers at a construction site:  “My mind was tormented by the question:  Are these still human beings, worthy of being part of a great nation?”  MK, Translated and edited by Alvin Johnson et.al., Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941, page 54.

[7] There’s an excellent discussion of the Volkisch movement in The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich, by George L. Mosse, Schocken Books, 1981.

[8] MK, Trans. Ralph Manheim, Houghton Mifflin, 1943; page 360.

[9] Hitler’s suggestion to the Volkisch leaders is thus not simply that they should stand aside, but that they should die off – completely consistent with Hitler’s recurrent insistence that ‘Nature’ determines that the weak should die to make way for the strong.

[10] Robert Payne, The Life and Death of Adolf Hitler, Prager, 1973; page 28.

Note: Both the Murphy and the Johnson translations are available at the Internet Archive.  https://archive.org/search.php?query=Mein%20Kampf